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Andrew Field* Air Travel, Accidents and Injuries:
Why the New Montreal Convention
is Already Outdated
The 1999 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air (the "Montreal Convention") came into force in 2003. It is the latest in a series
of attempts to replace a number of variations on the 1929 Warsaw Convention
with a single agreement which regulates the nghts and liabilities of international
air carners, their passengers and shippers. At the time, the Montreal Convention
was hailed as providing better protection and compensation for victims of air
accidents. However despite its recent adoption, in relation to claims for death
and personal injuries the Montreal Convention is still firmly planted in the outdated
terminology of its predecessor The effect of this is that many passengers suffering
injuries during international carriage are still left without a claim. For example, it is
now well established that mental injuries are generally not recognized under the
Convention. However, claims for certain injuries which are well associated with
air travel - such as Deep Vein Thrombosis (also colloquially known as "economy
class syndrome') - are also excluded. This is the recent finding of courts in a
number of different jurisdictions, but most significantly in class actions in Britain
and Australia. With such results, it is suggested that the basis for excluding these
claims under the new Convention should be reconsidered
La Convention pour Iunification de certaines regles relatives au transport aerien
international de 1999 (Ia - Convention de Montreal -), est entree en vigueur en
2003. C'est la plus rscente tentative pour remplacer une serie de supplements et
d'annexes 6 la Convention de Varsovie de 1929 par un accord unique qui regit les
droits et les responsabilitis des transports adnens internationaux, leurs passagers
et les expediteurs. A I'epoque. la Convention a 6t6 salude comme ameliorant la
protection et lindemnisation des victimes d'accidents d'avion. Toutefois, en depit
de son adoption recente, la Convention de Montreal reste fermement attach~e 
la terminologie desuete de Ientente precedente pour ce qui est des reclamations
en cas de mort ou de lesions corporelles Cela a pour resultat que beaucoup de
passagers qui subissent des lesions pendant un voyage international ne peuvent
toujours pas presenter de reclamation Par exemple, il est maintenant bien etabli
que les prejudices psychologiques ne sont habituellement pas reconnus par les
dispositions de la Convention. Par ailleurs, les reclamations pour certaines lesions
bien associees des voyages en avion - par exemple la thrombose veineuse
pro fonde (couramment appelee - syndrome de la classe 6conomique -) sont
aussi exclues. Crest la conclusion A laquelle les tribunaux de divers ressorts sont
arrives, plus particuli&rement dans des recours collectifs intentos en Grande-
Bretagne et en Australie. Face 6 de tels resultats, il est suggdr6 de revoir les
motifs de reclamation sous le regime de la nouvelle Convention.
* BA(Hons) LLM Monash, Barrister at La%% (Vic); Senior Lecturer. Department of Business Law
and Taxation, Monash University, Australia.
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Int'duction
On 5 September 2003, the International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO") announced wvith a degree of triumph that 1999 Convention for
the Unification of ('ertain Rules for International Carriage by A ir (the
"\Hontreul Convention") would become operational on 4 November.'
Quoted in the ICAO Press release, ICAO President, Dr. Assad Kotaite,
said,
Victims of international air accidents and their families wiill be better
protected and compensated under the new Montreal Convention, which
modernises and consolidates a seventN -five earold systemofinternational
instruments of priN ate international law into one instrument.-
With these words, Kotaite addressed txio aspects of the international
treaty s\ stem which governs legal rights of passengers. cargo owiners and
carriers (ie airlines) involv ed in international commercial air travel.
I ('oni'ention for thu' L.'mhcrtoo of ('crtom Rules fr lnternational Carriage by',4,r, 28 May 1999.
I I A''j ,\ I- N I A 21, I.C.A ( Doc. 4740) (entered into force 4 Noaember 2003), online: Australasian
I.ega Infiormation Institute .http/1',wwaustlii eduaulau> [Montrual Convention]. The Convention
became oprcrational on account of the ratification of the treatN by the United States of America, the
thirtieth ratil.ition of the treat which .as the triuer I ir its entry into force as set down in Article
53(6).
2, International (\ i A\i ation t)rganization. Nc\s Release, "Montreal Convention of 1999 on
(ompcnsation for Accident Victims set to enter Iorce", P.I.O. 14 2003 (5 September 2003). online:
International \.0 A% iation Organization <http: 'i'.' .v.icao.mtlicao cnnr/2003/pio200314.htm> (date
a .ce',cd 22 January 2004).
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Firstly, he summed up the effect of ICAO's attempts to remove
the patchwork of treaties which granted different rights on different
international flights - even if the flights Nvere between states which were
parties to various versions of the 1929 Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carrige by .4ir (the "-'arsaw
Convention").' This situation developed because over the years since the
IJWisaw Convention was agreed, as certain state parties considered its
provisions to be outdated, it was amended, first at the Hague in 1955 (the
"Hagte Protocol")4, then at Guadalajara in 1961, Guatemala in 1971, and
finally in a series of protocols agreed at Montreal in 1975. The patchwork
wvas created because not all parties to the 1fiarsai" Convtention had agreed
to all or even some of these amending treaties. Indeed, as was recently
decided in the United States, where two states are not parties to a common
version of the Jl;t-saw Convention then they are not parties to a common
treaty and so no version of the Convention applies - thus adding a second
"treaty-less" claim to the patchwork.
It might be pointed out that there is an irony in Kotaite's statement in
so far as the Montreal Convention came into force on the ratification by the
thirtieth party: there are still many signatories to this treaty who have not
ratified, and many other states which are parties to various versions of the
tarsaw Convention which have not even signed the new treaty. Thus, the
coming into force of the Convention \ould appear to have had the actual
effect of adding one more treaty to the patchwork.6 In other words, is has
contributed to further fragmentation. And yet, perhaps this is not such a
telling observation, because it can also be observed that in the two years
since the American ratification, further ratifications have seen the number
of parties to the Montreal Convention more than double.' If the pace of
3. International Convention for the Unfication of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, 12 October 1929, A..S, 1963 No. 15, [arsaw Convention].
4. Protocol amending the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by .ir of 12 October 1929. 2X September 1955, A.T.S. 1963 No. 18.
5. Chubb & Son Inc. s .4siana .4irlines 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000). The first "treaty-less" situation
is, of course, that which exists %%hen carnage occurs to or from a country which is not a party to any
%ersion of the W4arsaiv Convention.
6. This is. in fact, the exact danger w hich was anticipated in the final words of an otherwise
enthusiastic discussion of the ttuntreal Cmivention in Pablo Mendes De Leon & Weiner Eyskens, "The
Montreal Convention: Analysis of Some Aspects of the Attempted Modermization and Consolidation
of the Warsaw System" (2001) 66 J. Air. L. & Com. 1155 at 1185. Once again, as they concluded,
only time will tell whether a general adoption of the Montreal Convention will lead to an international
uniformity in such rules.
7. As of 25 July 2005, the Montreal Convention was in force in 66 different states, see online:
International Civil Aviation Organisation <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mt199.htm> (date accessed:
26 July 2005). However, it is important to recall that there are still over 150 parties to the un-amended
Warsaw Coni'ention, see online: International Civil Aviation Organisation <http://www.icao.int/icao/
en/leb/wc-hp.htm> (date accessed: 26 July 2005).
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this trend continues, then the patchwork will disappear, a possible scenario
which should not be dismissed. Perhaps, the fragmentation will be of only
a short duration.
However, the second matter to which Kotaite and ICAO sought to give
prominence is perhaps of more interest because it concerns the substantive
rights of victims and their families in international air accidents. Kotaite
said that these people would be better protected, both in their rights to law
suit and their rights to compensation. It is this suggestion which should
not be taken at face value. The provisions of the Montreal Convention do
clearly represent an improvement on the terms of the Warsaw Convention
in all of its guises. However, there are certain crucial restrictions on the right
to sue for death or injury which were in the 11iarsaw Convention and which
remain in the Iotreal Convention. At the very least, these restrictions
provide claimants with a substantially more limited basis for suing than
under the common law and probably under other legal systems well. This
is the common conclusion in a number of common law jurisdictions as
evidenced most recently in a series of decisions concerning actions against
airlines in which plaintiffs have made claims for injuries resulting from
Deep Vein Thrombosis ("DVT").
The purpose of this article is to argue that Article 17(1 ) of the Montreal
Convention, the provision which allows claims for death and injuries,
requires amending just as surely as did the equivalent provision - also
Article 17 - under the Ifinrsaw Convention. Section I of the article sets out
in overview the rationale and scheme for such claims under the Warsaw
Convention. As is explained in Section II, the Montreal Convention has
made some very clear improvements to the plight of claimants in some
areas, specifically as regards expanded limits to compensation. However,
the continued use of the terms "bodily injury" and "accident" in Article
17 as evidenced by their interpretation by the courts still imposes great
restrictions on plaintiffs' rights. The concept of "bodily injury" is
discussed in Section III and draws attention to the exclusion of claims for
any injuries which have no physical manifestation, such as psychological
injuries. Section IV deals with the restriction created by the use of the
word "accident," and specifically with the recent prominence given to this
issue through the recent DVT decisions.
Indeed, the most recent of those decisions, by the English Court of
Appeal in The Deep I ' in Thrombosis and Air Travel Litigation8 and the
Victorian Court of Appeal in Qantas Ltd and BritishA irwavs PLC v. Povey9
(confirmed by the High Court of Australia in Povev v Qantas Airways
, [2003] E W.CA. 1005 ID ;t].
9. 120031 VN.C.A. 227 [,,"cv, V( A 1
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Ltd'"), which dealt with DVT claims may in years to come prove to have
been pivotal. As class actions invoIh ing many claimants in jurisdictions
where such actions are still relativelh uncommon, they attracted a broad
degree of popular media interest. Ho\ e\ er, in seeing all of these claims fail,
they also illustrated the inadequacy of the existing formulation of Article
17 and the language of the Montreail Convention. They demonstrated that
these provisions are insufficient to deal with an injury which is so closely
associated with air travel that it has been dubbed "economy class syndrome"
(due to the propensity of such seats to promote such injuries). Therefore,
they illustrate how clearly the language of the Montreal Convention, an
agreement formulated on the eve of the twenty-first century, is still firmly
planted in terms agreed in the 1920s at the birth of commercial flight.
Further, in highlighting such deficiencies at a time when many states
are still to decide whether to adopt the Montreal Convention, they have
already provided a stimulus for a new regime. As was the case with Povey,
the English litigation is also the subject of an appeal to that jurisdiction's
highest court (i.e., the House of Lords)." However, the judgments already
delivered well illustrate the great dilemmas posed in such cases.
I. Overview of personal injuries compromise under the Waitrsaw System
One of the first characteristics identified when air travel was in its infancy
\\as that it is a potentially dangerous and even fatal activity. Indeed, it is
pertinent to recall that the world's first aeroplane pilot, Orville Wright,
after earning that title under the watchful eye of his brother Wilbur at Kitty
Hawk in 1903, later also made another "first": a few years later he was
the first pilot of an aeroplane involved in a fatal air accident in which his
passenger was killed.'2 Even a century later, travelling by air is still not
without risk.
It can be understood that the survival of airlines in the early days of
commercial air travel, when aircraft were less reliable than their modem
counterparts, was precarious. It was recognized that aircraft were prone
to accidents, and that passenger carriers were therefore prone to law
suits. It was determined by those states who were parties to the Warsaw
Convention that if the fledging industry of international air travel was to
survive it would need protection from the full weight of such suits as might
10. Povet v QaniasAirways Limited [2005] H.C.A. 33 [Povev, H.C.A.].
11. U.K., House of Lords, Minutes and Order Paper - Minutes of Proceedings (Wednesday 14 July
2004), Session 2003-4, online: http://www-.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/minutes/040714/
ldminut.htm (date accessed: 17 September 2004).
12. The crash occurred at Fort Myer, Washington, D.C. on 17 September 1908, and the passenger
was Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge. See John E. Walsh, One Dav at Kitty Hawk: The Untold Stor of
the Wright Brothers (New York: Crowell, 1975) 234-235.
74 The Dalhousie Law Journal
arise under domestic law. However, at the same time it was conceded
that the interests of passengers injured or killed in accidents needed to be
recognized as wvell.
A compromise was agreed for the benefit of the carriers, preventing
them from excluding liability,'l but placing a monetary limit on
compensation they might have to pay to claimants. Under Article 22, the
limit was set at 125,000 francs," or approximately USS8,300. The limit
was subsequently doubled in the 1955 Hague Protocol - although it still
represented a substantial limitation on claims. Further, the limit applied
with only three substantial exceptions:
Firstly, under Article 22(1) the carrier and the passenger could agree
by "special contract" to allow a higher limit of liability.
Secondly, under Article 3(2) the limit would not apply if the passenger
wvas not given notice in their ticket that the Mirsaw Convention applied,
although the Convention N ould apply to the carriage in relation to other
matters (i.e., which elements needed to be satisfied to found a claim as set
down in the Convention).
And thirdly, under Article 25(1) the limit would not apply if it was
established that the death or injury was caused by the "wilful misconduct"
of the carrier. Although not greatly affecting the meaning, the Hague
Protocol subsequently replaced this terminology with the more familiar
formulation "done w ith intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result."'"
For the passengers \\ ho wcrc having the amounts of compensation they
might claim limited, the key benefit of this scheme - the balancing factor
in their favour - \ as the creation of a regime based on a presumption of
liability against the carrier for that compensation. This presumption arose
where the claim could be established under the terms of Article 17, which
stated:
The carrier is liable for the damage sustained in the event of the death
or %\ounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger, if the accident Nvhich caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking."
13. II, r (t Conve',nt,n. supra note 3, Art. 23.
14. One Iranc \%as further defined to equal 65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900 under
Article 22 of the Warvaw Convention. This extra information allow. lor the value of a gold franc to
he determined even when the franc has ceased to be the national currency of France, replaced by the
Euro. l-fowever, the relrence to the franc does provide yet another illustration of how the language of
the lH-al-ai 'OCientlon is firmly planted in a b. gone age.
15. D)i'.usscd m Acvell i: Canadian Pacific .hrhw' (1976). 74 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (Ont. Co. Ct.); SS
Pharmaceutical v Qooiav Airways ( 1988) 22 N S.W.LR. 734 (Com. Div.).
16. Ifi ravw Convenwo.stqn-r note 3. Art. 17.
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Once such a claim \% as established, then the only basis upon which
the carrier could defend itself % as either under Article 20(1 ) by positively
establishing that it had taken "'all necessary measures" (which has been
held to mean that the carrier was not negligent),17 or under Article 21 by
establishing that the damage NNas caused or contributed to by the negligence
of the injured person.
Although prima .iici'. it might be considered that the "trade-off'
greatly favours the carriers, it should be recalled that there is a wide
spectrum coered from the minor injur% N% hich is incurred wvhile boarding
the aircraft, to the fatal experience. Arguably it is the former class of
injury which occurs N ith greater frequency. Therefore, the balance of the
compromise is not quite so clearly defined. Nevertheless, the seventy years
which have passed since the ii'arsaw Convention wvas adopted have clearly
allowed substantial scope for reform. With the development of modem
aircraft over that time, and the growth of carriers from fledgling infant
industries into multinational corporations which record annual profits
amounting to billions of dollars." the balance agreed in 1929 is clearly
outdated.
II. The Montreal Convention r'efolrms
1. Generalh'
The .\fontreal Convention introduces a number of changes. Some will have
a minimal effect on the position of claimants seeking compensation for
death or injuries incurred during international carriage. For example, in a
departure from the ffi.fsaw Convention the French text is no longer given
prominence over other versions of the treaty." Other provisions reflect the
innovations of the communications revolution. For example, presumably
as a concession to the electronic ticket purchased o\ er the Internet, no
longer will a failure to comply wvith the ticketing requirements (i.e., the
issuing of a ticket with a Warsaw notice) lead to the liability limits of the
17. For example, see Grein v ImperialAirwas [1937] I K.B. 50 at 59 N here Greer L.J. said that the
carrier would not be liable if:
he pro\es that by his agents or Ncrsants, he exercised all reasonable skill and care in taking all
necessary measures to a\oid causing damages by accident to the passenger, or pro\es it was
impossible to take such measures. This seems to me to amount to a promise not to injure the
passenger by avoidable accident, the onus being on the carrier to prove that the accident could
not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.
18. For example, it was recently reported that the Australian carrier Qantas recorded a half year
profit ofAUD 530.3 million. Geoff Easdown, HeraldSun (20 February 20i04) 35.
19. The signature clause at conclusion of convention notes that the treaty is in English, Arabic,
Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish "all texts being equally authentic."
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Convention not applying.2" Indeed, Article 3(5) specifically states that the
limits will apply in such circumstances.
Of more direct assistance to claimants will be Article 28 which requires
the carrier to make advance payments to claimants in cases of air travel
accidents which result in death or injury of passengers. Importantly, the
article notes that such payments do not constitute an admission of liability.
However, the provision clearly has a positive intention. In addition, Article
50 requires states who are parties to the Convention to require their carriers
to maintain adequate insurance so as to cover these costs, as well as any
liabilities which might arise under the Convention.
Of further practical importance, the Montreal Convention potentially
increases the choice of fora for a claimant in a death or injuries action.
Specifically, under Article 28 of the Iiiirsaw Convention, the claimant was
limited to four potential jurisdictions in which to bring a claim: before the
court where ( 1 ) the carrier is ordinarily resident, or (2) has its principal place
of business, or (3) where it has an establishment where the contract was
made, or (4) at the place of destination. These courts are set out in Article
33( 1 ) of the Montreal Convention, but Article 33(2) adds to this quartet
the court where the passenger "has his or her principal and permanent
residence" provided it is in a state which is party to the Convention.
These sorts of innovation will be of some assistance to many claimants.
However, it was the alteration to the monetary limits of compensation
which was given most prominence in the I.C.A.O. Press Release quoted




As noted above, under the Warsaw Convention the monetary limit of
liability was set at 125,000 francs (around US$8,300), and was only
amended once in the 1955 Hague Protocol. However, under Article 21 of
the Montreal Convention, this limit is now abolished and is replaced with a
new two-tier scheme, based not on the franc but rather on the International
Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right ("SDR").
Under the first tier, which is set out in Article 21 (1), the carrier cannot
exclude or limit its liability for damages not exceeding 100,000 SDRs.
This is a strict liability regime which applies irrespective of the carrier's
fault or lack thereof once the claim is established under Article 17.
20. rh.. problem under the Warsaw Convention is discussed in Andres Rueda, -The Warsaw
Conention and Electronic Ticketing" (2002) 67 . Air L. & Com. 401. While noting a conflicting
history of case law, Rueda argues that the notice requirement should be satisfied by the carrier
evidencing their consent to contractual tenns including the Warsaw notice online by ticking a dialogue
box on their computer screen. Ho\ever, he notes more convincingly the effect of the Montreal
Convention in addressing this situation.
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The second tier goes further in removing the protection previously
accorded the once fledging industry in that it finally removes the monetary
limit. However, it differs from the first tier in so far as the carrier is
permitted to defend itself. Specifically, in Article 21(2), it provides that
for damages exceeding 100,000 SDRs (approximately USS140,000), the
carrier shall not be liable if it provcs either that the damage was not due
to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier, or that
the damage was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act of a third
party. Clearly, there is a presumption of fault of the carrier, which it is
incumbent on the carrier to disprove. But subject to this onus of proof
being discharged, there is no limit to a carrier's potential liability.
Article 21 represents a great advance on the provisions of the 1JMrsaw
Convention. However, whether it represents such a great advance on the
substance of passengers' rights in practice is perhaps another matter.
Arguably, the reality is not quite as impressive as the appearance. This
is because since at least 1966 the limits set down in 'Wtirvaw Convention
have been rolled back by a series of private agreements and legislative
reforms.
The first of the private agreements was the Montreal Intercarrier
Agreement 1966 which set a no-fault liability limit of US$75,000 to apply to
those flights which begin, end or stop in the United States. This agreement
came about when the United States threatened to abandon the Warsaw
system through its dissatisfaction with the limited damages plaintiffs could
claim and the failure to increase them substantially in the Hague Protocol.
To dissuade the United States from such a course, the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) and its member carriers agreed to utilize the
option set out in Article 22, and by "'special agreement" in its contracts
with passengers set a higher liabilit\ limit.2'
Subsequent agreements included the agreement made at Malta in 1974
by which some western European countries decided to follow the American
example and encourage their carriers to make "special agreements." The
result was an increased limit of USS58,000, excluding legal costs, being
therefore roughly similar in limit to the .Mfontreal Intercarrier Agreement,
and differing only in that the carriers under this agreement did not agree to
21. Committee on Aeronautics, "The Warsaw Convention Revisited: An Update on Liability
Limitations for the Twenty-First Century" (May/June 1999) 54 The Record.- of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York 318.
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waive the "all necessary measures" defence32 Then, commencing in 1992,
ten Japanese carriers gave notice that they would not plead any defence
for damages up to 100,000 SDRs, thereby lifting the liability limit by a
substantial amount.2 1 Finally, in the late 1990s, a series of agreements
known collectively as the -IATA lntercarrier Agreements" matched this
sum, and also allowed for damages above that sum but subject to the
carrier's right to argue its defences." These anticipated provisions were
later adopted in the Ahotwral Convention.
The other method which has been used to increase liability limits is
legislative. In 1997, the European Union Council Regulation No 2027/97
came into force which also provided that carriers of its member states
should have unlimited liability, with absolute liability for the first 100,000
SDRs, -- once again predating Montreal. Similarly, Australia is another
country which by legislation has increased the liability limit, although in
that case the limit is set at comparatively low 260,000 SDRs.-"
The point being illustrated here is that in many cases, the much vaunted
increase of liability limits in the olntreal Convention is merely a case of
mirroring a reality which already exists. Indeed, noting that in 1998 over
one hundred carriers had signed the IATA Intercarrier Agreements of the
1990s,' 7 it is fair to say that they have had more to do with increasing
liability limits than the Montreal Convention. Accordingly, perhaps Dr.
Kotaite should have been a little more muted in trumpeting this particular
advance in international air law\ consumer protection.
3. The unrun'ormc'd criteria
The .1Iontreal Convention was not altered in any significant way with
regard to the criteria by which a claim can be made for death or injury.
The new formula found in Article 17(1) reads as follows:
22 Austl., Department of Transport and Regional Ser\ ices, "Consideration of the Ratification by
Australia of the Convention for the L ijfi aton o/ (,rtam Rule. fi" hittrnational Carriage by,4ir done
at Montreal on 28 %la\. 1999 (The Montreal Conentonl and Related Aviation Matters: Discussion
Paper" (January 2001). online: Department of Transportation and Regional Services <http:!/N\svA.
dotar,.go% au/a, naptipb/mcdiscussionpaper.aspx [DOTARS].
23. Committee on Aeronautics, supra note 21 at 322.
24. I/mi at 325
25. EU, "Council Regulation (F() No 2(027 97 o1'9 October 1997 on Air Carrier Liability in the
Event ofAccidents". Oflicial journal NO, L 285. 17/1 1/i 997 P. 0001 - 0003. Article 3, online: Europe:
Gale\%ay to the European Union - http://europa.cu/int/comm/transport/themes/air/english/libmry/
council-regulation-202797.pdf' (date acce,,,,ed 9 March 200334).
26 Cioil Avation (C'arrit,r 'Liahihi) ..lct 1959 (Cth.), ss. II A. 21 A.
27 ('ommittec on Aeronautic,,, visira note 21 at 32X.
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The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused
the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. -9
A comparison with Article 17 of the J1|isaw ('onrenlion quoted above
reveals only minor and apparently insignificant changes. Thus, it would
appear that the 1929 conception of claims will remain for some time to
come. It means that how these terms are understood under the fl'iwsaw
Convention will probably continue to be the case. Indeed, the refusal of
the signatories to alter those terms despite suggestions to use broader
terms mooted by national delegations during negotiations, would tend to
confirm this. 9 Thus, the damage must be caused by an "accident," and the
injury must be "bodily" and nothing else. The irony is that while the use
of these terms was being confirmed, almost contemporaneously a degree
of uniformity in their interpretation in common law jurisdictions was also
being confirmed, an interpretation which NNould exclude certain claims. In
very clear terms, and led very persuasively by the United States Supreme
Court and the British House of Lords and Court of Appeal, the limitations
of "accident" and "bodily injury" haNe now been made clearly apparent.
III. "Bodily Injur"
1. The rule in Eastern .4 irlines v Floyd
Most personal injuries suffered during a flight pose no difficulty under
Article 17. The broken leg caused by slipping while boarding an aircraft,
or the head wound sustained when an aircraft dips in an air pocket and
the passenger collides with the upper bulkheads are unambiguously
"bodily injuries." However. even those who are unfamiliar with Newton's
universal law of gravity are conscious that engaging in the activity of flying
carries with it the risk of falling back to earth, and this realization can
induce in some cases emotional responses of fear. In the age of flight, the
incidence of aircraft crashes, terrorism and hijackings has also given rise
to many instances of emotional responses of some magnitude, sometimes
described as "mental injuries" in passengers. The difficulty under the
Warsaw Convention is that it has been determined as a general rule that
the expression "bodily injury" does not include a mental injury.
This was the result which has flowed from the leading case of Eastern
Airlines v Floyd,30 a decision of the United States Supreme Court. In that
28. Montreal Convention, supra note I, Art. 17.
29. See discussion of negotiating history as explained in Morris v KLA Roval Dutch Airlines [2002]
2 All E.R. 565 at 580 (C.A.).
30. 499U.S. 530(U.S. Sup. Ct. 1991).
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case, shortly after take-off from Miami, Florida on a flight to the Bahamas,
one of the aircraft's engines lost oil pressure and was shut down. However,
soon after, the remaining two engines also failed. The crew notified the
passengers that the aircraft was losing height and that a crash landing into
the sea was imminent. A collision was averted when at the last moment one
of the engines re-started and the aircraft returned to Miami. However, after
the event a number of passengers brought claims alleging damages for the
obvious emotional distress they experienced. The court, noting that this
damage was unaccompanied by any physical injuries, had to determine
whether such a claim, described as "only a mental or psychic injury,"'"
fell within the terms of a "bodily injury." The court decided that it did not,
stating:
Our review of the documentar, record for the Warsaw Conference
confirms - and the courts and commentators appear universally to
agree - that there is no e\ idence that the drafters or signatories of the
IWir.saw Convention specificall,, considered liability for psychic injury
or the meaning of "lesion corporelle"... Indeed the unavailability of
compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and civil
law countries at the time of the Jfiir.aw Convention persuades us that
the signatories had no specific intent to include such a remedy in the
Convention, Because such a remedy %as unknown in many, if not most
jurisdictions in 1929. the drafters most likely xould have felt compelled
to make an unequivocal reference to purely mental injury if they had
specificall intended to allow such recoe ry.1-
This view was subsequently confirmed in other jurisdictions. For
example, in the House of Lords in Britain in Sidhu v. British .4 iravs-3 it
was accepted that psychological injuries did not fall within the meaning
of -bodily inj ury," although the appeals in that case were rejected on other
grounds.
In Australia, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the case of
Kotsambasis %: Singapore Airlines, 4 also endorsed the Floyd judgment. In
that case the claim for purely psychological injury arose out of a passenger's
mid-flight distress at seeing smoke billowing from the aircraft's starboard
engines which had caught fire.
Similarly, Flvd has also been endorsed in Canada. In Chau v. Delta
Airlines?" the Ontario Superior Court of Justice refused a claim for
31. thd at 53o
32, IhNd al 544-545
11 [19971 ] l ER. 193 (H.L.) [Stdhu].
34. (1997)42NS.W.L.R, 110 (CA,),
35, 67 )R. (3d) lox (Ont Sup ct Jus.), online: <http:/!canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2003/2003
onc I 157')html> (da c accc',cd 22 January 2004).
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-'embarrassment and emotional distress" experienced by the plaintiffs
when they were asked to leave the aircraft prior to take-off after a dispute
involving seating arrangements. Sitting at the more trivial end of the
spectrum, this was held not to be an example of a "bodily injury."
2. M1 'ntal injuries accompanied by phwsical injuries?
There was a significant issue which the court in Floyd left unanswered.
Although a purely mental injury might not fall within Article 17, what
would be the fate of a psychological injury which was accompanied by a
physical injury? In Kotsambasis. it was noted that this possibility was not
resolved in Floyd. However, it has been addressed in a number of recent
cases in the United States.16 Firstly, in the 1998 case of Terrafranca v.
Nirgin Atlantic Airways,' the plaintiff's claim arose from her response
to events aboard a flight to London, when mid-flight the crew announced
to the passengers that they had received a warning indicating that there
might be a bomb onboard. This warning was subsequently discovered to
be a hoax. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine
whether the physical manifestations of a passenger's extreme emotional
distress, which comprised anorexia and weight loss of some seventeen
pounds, constituted a bodily injury. Ruling that this was not the case, the
court said that what was required \%as a "direct, concrete, bodily injury as
opposed to mere manifestation of fear or anxiety." 3
A similar decision was reached in the 2001 case of Carev it United
Airlines. 9 In that case, during a flight from Costa Rica to Los Angeles,
the plaintiff who was seated in first class was visited mid-flight by his two
children who were seated in coach class. The children had earaches. The
plaintiff was warned by cabin staff that the children were not permitted
in that section of the aircraft. With one of his daughters in tears, the
plaintiff then explained that they were ill, and was threatened with arrest
under air regulations. A heated exchange then followed and the flight
attendant proceeded to "humiliate Carey in front of the other first-class
passengers. 40 The plaintiff's claim against the carrier was for "physical
manifestations including nausea, cramps, perspiration, nervousness,
36. The issue was addressed with a degree of confusion, as discussed in J. Brent AlIdredge,
"Continuing Questions in A% ation Liability Law: Should Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention hc
Construed to Encompass Physical Manifestations of Emotional and Mental Distress?" (2002) 67 J. Air
L. & Com. 1345.
37. 151 F.3d 108 (3 d Cir. 1998) (C.A.).
38. Ibid. at 112.
39. 255 F.3d 1044(9-Cir.2001)(C.A.).
40. Ibid. at 1047.
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tension and sleeplessness.""1 Once again the court held that mere physical
manifestations of emotional distress could not constitute bodily injuries.
These cases therefore tend to suggest that any "bodily injuries" which
result from mental or "'emotional" injuries which in themselves could not
be identified physically could not fall within Article 17. And yet, against
this trend the decision of the U.S. District Court in Weaver v. Delta
.4irlines4" suggested another approach by which damages arising from
mental injuries could be recovered. In that case mechanical problems to the
aircraft necessitated an emergency landing. This event caused the plaintiff
to experience emotional distress and she was diagnosed as suffering post-
traumatic stress disorder. HoAever, her claim included expert medical
evidence which said that the "impact on Kathy Weaver of the events which
occurred on that flight was extreme and included biochemical reactions
which had physical impacts upon her brain and neurologic system."' 4 -
Faced with such evidence of mental injury, Chief Judge Shanstrom noted
that the plaintiff's
action here is distinguishable from previous cases, because her claim is
presented as a physical injury and she relies on recent scientific research
explaining that post-traumatic stress disorder evidences actual trauma to
brain cell structures. Weaver's post-traumatic stress disorder evidences
an injur,. to her brain, and the onl% reasonable conclusion is that it is, in
fact, a bodily injury .... The legal question in this case is simply whether
the Warsa% Convention allows reco% ery for this particular kind of bodily
injury, i.e., a brain injury (e% en %% ith slight physical effects). The answer
must be %es.4
3. Morris v KLM
The ll'aver decision might best stand up to the passage of time because it
\.'as the judgment which was picked up by the House of Lords in its recent
decision in Morris v: KLM Ro'al Dutch .4irlines.15 Morris is a significant
case for t\wo reasons. Firstly, in endorsing the rule in Floyl, it illustrates
the international consistency applied to the interpretation of Article 17.
However, by adopting the reasoning in lfeaver, the House of Lords also
appears to have provided a senior court judgment which sheds light on the
ambiguity which remained from the Floyd judgment.
Mhris actually concerned two appeals. However, only the first
involved "'international carriage." In that case, the sixteen-year-old female
41 Ihid at I45
42 ,1 ,qupp. 2d 1190 (t1 N. Dist. Ct. Miont. 1999).
43. Ibid. at 1191.
44 Ihid at 1192.
45 120021 t K II.I., 7 (H.L.) Itr,, , IL],
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plaintiff, wvas travelling from Malaysia to Amsterdam. She was seated next
to two men. After eating a meal she fell asleep. She awoke later to discover
the hand of the man next to her touching her thigh, caressing her between
her hip and knee. She got up and reported this to one of the cabin crew.
However, after the flight she became depressed and went to see a doctor who
diagnosed that she "as suffering from clinical depression. Anti-depressive
treatment was started. When the plaintiff sued the carrier, although she did
not seek to establish any physical injury, she was successful. However,
this finding vas overturned by the Court of Appeal vhich considered that
physical injury and mental illness are distinguishable, with the former
involving damage to the structure of the body, while the latter affects the
well-being of the mind without organic change to the body. As the plaintiff
did not contend that she suffered a physical injury, the carrier's appeal was
successful. And yet, although this decision \\as confirmed by the House
of Lords, the reasoning \N ith regard to mental illness was not so clearly
delineated.
The House of Lords endorsed the reasoning in 11eaver. Lord Hope
(with wvhom Lords Nicholls and Steyn agreed) considered that 11 aver
broke newv ground,"° and said that if physical changes to the brain could
be established, it would not be right to refuse compensation for an Article
17 claim.'-
Lord Hobhouse (with whom Lord Nicholls agreed), when explaining
the burden on the plaintiff, said "bodily injury" means:
a change in some part or parts of the body of the passenger which is
sufficiently serious to be described as an injury. It does not include
mere emotional upset such as fear, distress, grief or mental anguish....
A psychiatric illness may often be evidence of a bodily injuiy
, 
or the
description of a condition which includes bodily injury. But the passenger
must be prepared to prove this, notjust prove a psychiatric illness without
evidence of its significance for the existence of a bodily inju.i'/"
He expressed dissatisfaction with the distinction drawn between a
'"bodily injury" and a "mental injur.' He noted that the latter expression
formed the "cornerstone of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal" but that
it was "devoid of actual meaning" because it related to the mind which is
a metaphysical concept. Thus, the expression "created a false antithesis"
with "bodily injury.149 Summing up the changes which have occurred in
dealing with such injuries since 1929. His Lordship said:
46. Ibid. at 118.
47. Ibid. at 125.
48. Ibid. at 143.
49. Ibid. at 158.
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There now exist techniques for investigating the functioning of the living
brain and the central nervous system together with the roles played by
neurotransmitters, hormones and electrical impulses. Physical changes
can be scanned and observed using sophisticated instruments and the
alterations in the normal chemistry of the brain can now be detected by
sophisticated sampling techniques. What was previously invisible can
now be made visible. These developments have two relevant results. It
can now be shown by valid scientific techniques that certain psychiatric
symptoms correspond to physical changes in the brain."
Thus, such "mental injuries" could be "bodily injuries." Unfortunately
for the plaintiff, her claim failed on a more basic point. Although she
pleaded a prima facie case of bodily injury in relation to her psychiatric
injury, she also pleaded that the assault did not cause her any physical
injury and (to use Lord Hobhouse's words) "she has implicitly stated that
she will not be able to prove any bodily injury." "
Of course, although the decision in Morris provides evidence that
illnesses of the brain can fall within the terms of Article 17, it is also clear
that there are limits to what scientific observation can disclose. No doubt in
years to come, many more "mental injuries" will be physically identifiable
and the "bodily injury" restriction will not appear so obnoxious. However,
in the meantime, the continued use of this language in the Montreal
Convention represents a clear and intended limitation on passengers'
rights against carriers. It is a limitation which stands despite early efforts
in the negotiating of the Convention to establish a separate basis for claims
for mental injury, efforts which were abandoned when it was discovered
broad support would not be obtained.52 Thus, until such time as science
can identify the effects on the brain of such incidents as have occurred
during air travel, be it hijackings, engine failure and even non-physical
50. IbTd at 152.
51. Ibid. at1X4.
52. N\ hen the matter was raised in the House of Commons, the British Secretary of State for the
En' ironment, Transport and Regions said:
In preparation for the Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal in May 1999, at which the
(n'on ention A as signed, the UK supported a proposal by Sweden for a separate head of claim for
mental injury. Prior to the Conference, however. that proposal vas withdrawn from the draft text
of the Convention. Our position Aas that a separate claim for mental injury could be advocated
only if there Nas sufficient support to gain global agreement. There was not sufficient support
so, in the interest of securing the best deal for the UK, it was decided to support the text of the
Convention N ithout a separate reference to mental injur
I K, I.C., Par/iamentarv i)chcbie. Session 1999-2000, \ol. 353. col. 87 W-88W (3 July 2000) (Mr.
Kcith Hill, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions),
online. United Kingdom Parliament <http://wwa .publications.parliament.uk>. Also reproduced in
thr is, HL. Lqira note 45 at 31.
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assault, those passengers who suffer such personal injuries will be without
a remedy. 3
IV. The "Accdent threshold and D T
The second major difficulty in establishing a claim under Article 17 is
proving that the death or injury was caused by an accident on board the
aircraft or during the operations of embarking or disembarking. The limits
of embarking and disembarking ha e been fairly well established, and
are determined on the basis of the passenger's activity at the time of the
accident, their location at that time, and the extent to which the carrier was
exercising control over the passenger. 4 However, the requirement that the
death or injury be caused by an 'accident" has proved more troublesome,
particularly in common la\N jurisdictions wvhere the la\N of negligence has
predominated in personal injuries cases for much of the last century. This
is because the claim based on negligence is predicated on the rule that a
defendant is required to pre-empt reasonably foreseeable dangers to people
to whom they owe a duty of care." including those \\ ho are in their care. In
contrast, the requirement of an "'accident" to cause an injury, and the way
that term has been understood, has had the effect of greatly narrowing the
number of claims to which a carrier might otherwise have been subject.
1. Air France v: Saks
The distinction between a claim in negligence and a claim arising under
Article 17 was clearly established in 1985 in the leading decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Air France ,. Saks (Saks). 6 In that case, a
passenger's claim for injury was based on pain and hearing loss in her left
ear, caused by the pressurization of the aircraft cabin during the aircraft's
descent. Initially, the plaintiff had attempted to argue that her injury
was caused by the negligent maintenance of the pressurization system.
53. Nevertheless, it has been %nritten by John F. Easton, Jennifer E. Trock & Kent A. Radford, "Post
Traumatic 'Lesion Corporelle': A Continuum of Bodily Injury Under the V'arsj % Convention" (2003)
68 J. Air L. & Com. 665 at 698 that "plaintiffs %%ill continue to push the en\ elope with the backing of
experts and application of advances in science and medicine for more rulings to the effect that PTSD
[ie "post-traumatic stress disorder"] is itself a physical injury...." This weN is almost certainly correct.
However, the authors also note that the analysis of such claims in\ ol\ ing emotional injury is unlikely
to change under the present Convention formulation.
54. SeeDay v Trans WorldAirlines, 393 F.Supp. 217(S.D.N.Y., 1975)(injuries and deaths incurred
in airport terminal during terrorist attack after passengers checked in, proceeded through passport
control and were situated in the departure lounge occurred during "embarkation"); Evangelinos 1:
Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152 (3 ' Cir. P.A., 1977)(same facts); tlcCarthy/ r Northern Airlines,
Inc., 56 F.3d 313 (1 ' Cir. Mass., 1995)(injury incurred on airport escalalor after passenger had checked
in but prior to passenger reaching departure gate held not to have occurred during embarkation).
55. This is, of course, the most fundamental of principles derived from Donoghue 1: Stevenson,
[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) [Donoghue].
56. 470 U.S. 392, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985) [Saks].
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lowever, this argument was abandoned when it was conceded that the
system had operated in the usual manner. At this stage, the plaintiff also
acknowledged that the sole issue was whether her injury had been caused
by an accident. On this basis her claim was struck out by the District Court
because it was held not to have been caused by an "accident." When the
question of what constituted an accident came before the Supreme Court,
O'Connor J, who delivered the judgment of the court, said:
We conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to a passenger. This definition should
be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding
a passenger's injuries."
In addressing the plaintiff's specific claim Her Honour observed that:
But when the injury indisputably results from the passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the
aircraft, it has not been caused b\ an accident, and Article 17 of the
Warsa\% Convention cannot apply."
Immediately apparent in this definition is the very different basis
of liability from that in negligence. Where under the law of negligence
reasonable forseeability forms the basis of a claim, the essential element
of an accident is that it is not foreseeable but unexpected. Indeed, if the
danger is foreseeable -indeed (in a brutal juxtaposition) if the danger is
certain - then there can he no accident because it is not unexpected.
Despite the apparent clarity of the Saks definition of accident,
subsequent courts in the United States have grappled with how broadly this
notion of an "accident" needs to be construed. Generally, accidents arising
out of such "risks [as] are characteristic of air travel" ' " will be covered
without difficulty and included within Article 17. However, tortious acts
of third parties have proved problematic. Hijackings and terrorist attacks,
for example, have been stated to clearly fall within Article 17." Similarly,
in Oh'topic .Virwas v. Husain" when a flight attendant repeatedly refused
requests to move an asthmatic passenger away from the smokers' section
of cabin, the carrier was held liable when the passenger subsequently died
from a severe asthma attack. In contrast, in Price v British Airways,62
when the injury to one passenger occurred \\hen he was punched without
57 Ibid at 405.
5X Ibid. at 4(16.
5) ('urkv v 4nierican ,,rlines 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.NY., 1994) at 283.
6'0. Ibid.
61. 540 U S 644 (20(04), 2004 U.S. LI'XIS 1620) (S. Ct., 2004) [Olympic.4mwuvs].
62, 1'2 t 1.S, Dit LIXIS 95X1 (SU.NY_. 1992).
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provocation by another passenger, it %%as determined that this wNas not an
accident under Article 17 because the "fracas \\as not a characteristic risk
of air travel."" - Despite these extremes. a reconciliation of these readings
appears to haN e been found in the judgment in 11'/lace v Korean .Hr." 4 In
that case, a sleeping passenger \as sexually molested by the passenger
seated beside her. However, despite this attack being made by a third party
unconnected with the carrier, the United States Court of Appeal w\as able
to point to certain characteristics of air travel which contributed to making
this unexpected or unusual event an Article 17 "accident." These included
the passenger's confined position in a cramped seat between two men she
did not know, in a cabin vith the lights turned down, and her inability to
escape immediately when she woke up. Added to this was the total failure
of even a single flight attendant to notice a problem - something which
was clearlv unexpected. The claim was allo%\ ed to proceed.
A further problem identified has been that that which is "unusual or
unexpected" does not al\\ ays constitute an accident, because it is not an
"event or happening" as required in Saks. Such an argument was advanced
in Olympic .4ir-wavs v. Husain when (as noted abo'e) the flight attendant
refused requests that an asthmatic passenger be moved from the smoking
section of an aircraft. The focus of this argument was on the failure of
the attendant to mo\e the passenger. However, the argument was swiftly
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. which considered that the flight
attendant's "rejection of an explicit request for assistance \\ould be an
'event' or 'happening'.""' This w as clearly something more than mere
inaction.
The force of the "non-event or happening" argument is more
accurately appreciated in a case like Potter v. Delta Air Lines.," In that
case, the United States Court of Appeal refused a claim for injuries caused
by the failure of the plaintiff to ask an obnoxious passenger to awake and
return his reclined chair to its upright position, the result of w\hich was
that the plaintiff tripped and fell wvhen she attempted to return to her seat.
This claim was refused because although a rude and hostile passenger is
unusual or unexpected, "neither a fully reclined seat nor the act or sleeping
in it is an unusual or unexpected e\ ent or happening on an airplane." ' 7
Once again, the difference between a claim in negligence and an Article
17 claim is apparent. Whereas inaction might give rise to a claim in the
63. Ibid.
64. 214 F.3d 293 (2 d Cir. N.Y., 2(00).
65. Olvmpic Airlines, supra note 61 at 2 .
66. 98 F.3d 881 (5- Cir. Tex., 1996).
67. Ibid. at 884.
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former, it is an irrelevant issue to the determination of whether an accident
has occurred.
And yet, despite the limitations in these readings of what is meant by
"accident," the rule in Saks has continued to be endorsed not only by courts
in the United States but also in many other jurisdictions, including Great
Britain," Canada" and Australia,"' and it is clearly the rule applicable to
Article 17.
2. Deep Vein Thrombosis
The limiting effect of the "accident" requirement in Article 17 has recently
received very widespread prominence due to the greater awareness
in the travelling community of deep vein thrombosis ("DVT"). This is
particularly the case in Great Britain and Australia due to the recent and
substantial class actions which were commenced in those countries, The
Deep I in Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation (the "D VT Group
Litigation")" and Pove' v Qantas .4 irwavs Limited Ltd (-Povey"), 72 and
the atmosphere of broad media coverage in which they were conducted. 3
DVT was described in the pleadings in the DVT Group Litigation in the
following terms:
Deep Vein Thrombosis ("DVT') is a condition in which a small blood
clot or thrombus forms mainly in the deep veins of the legs. Such clots
can be present without symptom or signs, but may give rise to swelling
of the affected leg, sometimes accompanied by pain and local tenderness.
Complications arising from DVT may be life-threatening. Complications
occur when a thrombus breaks away from the wall of the vein to which it
is attached and is carried along v ith the flow of the blood as an embolus.
If the embolus reaches a blood vessel through which it cannot pass, it
blocks the vessel, thereby producing an embolism. The most serious of
68. .lorris, HL, supra note 45 at 71 per Lord Hope, 134 per Lord Hobhouse.
69. Quinn v. Canadian Airlines International, [1997] O.J No. 1832, 1997 Carswell Ont. 1583
(C A )
70. In .4girack 'Tit/as Spring Air) v Hatfield, (20031 VS.C.A 6 at para. 15. the Victoria Court of
Appeal endorsed the rule in its determination of the meaning of"accident" in relation to a claim arising
under legislation dealing with a domestic air carriage but which was drafted in the same terms. The
High Court of Australia also endorsed Saks in Porev, H.C.A.. supra note 10.
71. D 1T, supra note 8.
72. See Povev, H.C.A., supra note 10; Pove" VC A., supra note 9.
73. No doubt further prominence in the community was given to these cases because although the
same law was being applied, on the same day in 2002, an English judge struck out the claim in that
country whilc an Australian judge allowed the Australian claim to sursi\e. Ultimately, on appeal, the
result,; would conform. Howse\er, in the short term \w orld of newspaper sales, this was just the sort of
rift between Australia and the "mother country" which can ha\ e the effect of selling more newspapers.
See Fergus Shiel, "Airlines face claims after clot ruling" TheAge (21 December 2002); David Drood,
"British blood clot ruling could prompt appeal in local case" The Sunday Age (22 December 2002).
Both judgments, Povev v Civil Aviation Authorit1, & Ors, 2002] V.S.C. 580 and The Deep Vein
Thrtwlh,,sis andAir Travel Litigation, [2002] EW H.C. 2825 (Q.B.), were delivered on 20 December
2002.
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these occurs in the lungs (a pulmonary embolism), which gives rise to
chest pain and breathing difficulties and, in the worst cases, death from
respiratory failure."4
The concern is that as illustrated in the pleadings (quoted below), a
DVT injury is very clearly the sort of injury which could be described
as arising in circumstances "characteristic of air travel." Further, as the
numbers of claimants involved in the class actions indicate, it is widespread.
The failure to allow the claims has left these existing plaintiffs and untold
future claimants without a remedy against the carriers.
The decisions in these two cases wvere not without precedent. For
example, back in 1976 in one of the earliest DVT cases, the Supreme
Court of New York decided in Scherer : Pan .4merican wIJrld Airways "5
that there was no "accident" as required under Article 17 because the
plaintiff's 'thrombophlebitis" resulted from the plaintiff "merely 'sitting."
during a flight from Tokyo to California. More recently, in Rodriguez v
.4nsett .4ustralia" the United States Court of Appeal rejected a claim on
the basis of the plaintiff's failure to establish that an "accident" caused
the DVT, a decision echoed in Canada by the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice in McDonald v Korean Air" and in Germany by the Regional
Court of Frankfurt am Main in Reinder I blander v Deutsche Lufthansa. "'
The English and Australian cases have now affirmed these decisions and
did so in remarkably similar ways.
3. The DPT Group Litigation
In the English D I'T Group Litigation, fifty-five claims were made against
twenty-seven carriers.7 9 In this respect it was similar to Povev. Other
similarities between the two cases included that in both sets of litigation,
as in those other cases noted above, the key issue was whether the DVT
was caused by an "accident." In both cases, the carrier sought to have
the claims struck out because there was no accident. Finally, both cases
also seemed to devolve into a discussion on two contentions by the
74. D. 17, supra note Sat 6.
75. 54 A.D. 2d 636 (S.C.N.Y.. 1976).
76. 383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. Cal., 2004).
77. 2002 Can LII 3901, Court file no: 01-B30373 (O.N.S.C.), online: <www.canlii.org> (date
accessed: 22 January 2004).
78. Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, File No 2-21 0 54/01, 29 October 2001, A. 231 in Condon
& Forsyth LLP (February 2002) The Liability Reporter 38, online: <http://www.iata.org/NRI
ContentConnector/CS2000/Siteinterface/sites/legal/file/2003_LiabilityReporter.pdl- (date accessed:
8 March 2004).
79. This is the figure given in the judgment of Nelson J. at first instance; see Deep Vein Thrombosis
and Air Travel Group Litigation, [2002] E.W.H.C. 2825 (Q.B.) at para. I [D. VT, QB]. However,
before the Court of Appeal the numbers of parties were expressed as 24 passengers with claims against
18 carriers, see D. VT, supra note 8 at para. 2.
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plaintiffs. The first contention was, could the failure to warn passengers of
the dangers of DVT in itself constitute an accident'? Secondly, and in the
alternative, could a series of incidents of commercial air travel constitute
a single accident?
In the D'TGroup Litigation, the specimen pleading said the DVT was
the fault of the defendant wvho :
(1) required the Claimant to sit in a seat which due to its insufficient
\\ idth, the insufficient distance between it and seats on either side
of it and the insufficient distance between it and seats in front and
behind it discouraged andlor prevented the Claimant from moving
out of his seat throughout the flight or most of the flight and/or
restricted his movement andor caused him to sit in a cramped
position while seated in it when it kneN\ or ought to have known
that discouraging and or preventing the Claimant from doing
these things or any of them and/or causing him to sit in a cramped
position could cause and/or would increase the risk of the flight
causing a DVT to the Claimant:
(2) pro\ ided or caused there to be
(i) insufficient space between seats
(ii) insufficient air pressure \\ithin the cabin and/or
(iii) insufficient levels of oxygen within the cabin and/or
(i) insufficient amounts of fresh air and movement of that
air within the cabin and/or
(0) insufficiently humid air within the cabin and/or
(i) a temperature within the cabin that was high or excessively
high.1"I
Could this constitute an accident?
At first instance the judge ruled that this could not be an "accident"
thereby bringing the plaintiff's claim to an end." This decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal. In the latter court, Lord Phillips MR (with whom
Judge and Kay LJJ agreed) adopted the Saks rule and swiftly determined
that there were tm o elements to be satisfied to constitute an accident: first,
there must be an event, and second, it must be "unusual. unexpected or
unto\\ard."' - Lord Phillips conceded that such matters as the act of the
pressurization, supply or oxygen or temperature of the aircraft cabin
could all constitute an 'event." However, he also considered that they are
"like cramped seats... integral features of carriage."" He denied "that
the existence of these permanent features of the aircraft, or the subjecting
x D iT, %upra note X at para. f-7.
Xl. [2003] 1 All ER. 935; [2002] E.W.H.C. 2X25 (Q.B,
X2, D 1T, supra note X at para. 23.
X3. Mid at para. 22.
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of passengers to the carriage in aircraft with these features, is capable of
amounting to an event."' 4 As to \\ hether the failure to N\ am passengers of
the dangers of DVT could on its own constitute an accident, His Lordship
plainly stated, "I cannot see how this failure can be categorised as an
accident. It was simpl something that did not happen - a non event."s'
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed.
4. Pove v, Qantas
In the Australian case of Povev v" Qantias the same result \\as reached
although by a slightly more tortuous route. The plaintiff \\ as running a case
to test the claim before the determination of over three hundred other claims
which had been issued out of the Supreme Court of Victoria." The facts of
this test case concerned a sixty-one-y ear-old plaintiff \ ho claimed to have
suffered a deep \ein thrombosis which led to a pulmonary embolism and a
stroke which left him with significant permanent disabilities. The plaintiff
argued that his DVT comprised the formation of a blood clot in the deep
vein of his right leg and that he first experienced symptoms whilst flying
on a British Airways flight betmeen Kuala Lumpur and Sydney. Once
again, he claimed his DVT \\as caused by an "accident," the content of his
pleading being essentially the same as that in the DVT Group Liligalion
quoted abo% e.' " At first instance, an application by the carriers to have the
claim struck out was refused - subject to amendments being made to his
inadequate pleading." Howe\ er. before the Victorian Court of Appeal, the
claim was struck out, on1N one of the three judges being concerned that
X4. Ibid at para. 28.
$5. Ibid. at para. 31.
86. Before the Supreme Court of NeNs South \Vale, in R;.sNcnboom v Quntas .4irwc,v. [2(1121
N.S.W.S.C. 792 in vhich case eight plaintiff' %%ere granted their applications to have their DV.T.
claims transferred to the Supreme Court of Victoria. alfidas it e\ idence noted that proceedings had
been instituted on behalf of 326 claimants in the latter court, all plaintiff, claiming damage. for D13.T..
ibid at para. 9.
87. In Povey, VC.A., supra note 9 at para. 52. the plaintiff said the D.V.T was caused by "the
conditions of and procedures relating to pa,,encr tra,.el upon the flights." These "flight conditions"
included:
(ai a confined and restncted physical ens ironment in which the plaintiffAas immobilised for
long periods of time in a ',catcd position;
(b) impediments to the plaintiff getting out of his scat during the flights;
(c the offer and supply of alcoholic beserages, tea and coffee to the plaintiff during the
flights;
(d) discouraging the plaintiff from mos ing around the cabin of the aircraft and encouraging the
plaintiff to remain seated during the flights;
(e) the plaintiff not being pro, ided sith any information or warning about the risk orfD.VT. or
information about the measures %%hich the plaintiff could take to reduce such risk.
The most apparent difference between the pleadings in the two case'. appears to be that principles of
plain English have penetrated the legal profession in Australia more effectisely than in England.
88. Pover l: Civil ,h'ntio ,S'oe" ,lntheri
"
[2012] VS.C. 580.
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such a substantial piece of litigation should not be disposed of summarily. 9
However, despite this similarity in the decision with that in the DVTGroup
Litigation, the judgments - or at least the extensive judgment of Ormiston
J.A. - deserves some further examination as in dealing with the arguments
of the plaintiff, it not only once again sets out the parameters of an accident
but clearly addresses the relationship between the tort of negligence and
Article 17 - an issue to which lawyers in common law jurisdictions seem
to be constantly drawn.
With respect to the issue of whether a failure to warn the plaintiff of
the dangers of DVT could constitute an "accident," the three members of
the court were in agreement. It could not. Ormiston J.A. remarked that
I would venture to suggest that it is not the failure to take the step which
is properly to be characterised as an accident but rather its immediate
and disastrous consequence... It is a slide in reasoning to say that every
failure to do that which a carrier ought to do necessarily amounts to an
accident, although it may frequently lead to such an event."
For example, His Honour noted that a failure by a pilot to let down the
landing wheels may lead to an accident but is not itself an accident. Thus,
echoing Lord Phillips M.R., His Honour stated that l[ilt is hard to see how
a failure to Nvarn or advise passengers, a 'non-event' as it were, can ever
constitute an accident within the meaning of the article, not withstanding
the presence of surrounding circumstances which would make the failure
unusual."'
As to %vhether the "flight conditions" could constitute an accident,
Ormiston J.A. (who with Chernov J.A. formed a majority) identified a
series of contentions argued by the plaintiff, none of which he considered
was correct. The plaintiff first argued that a broad reading should be given
to the word "accident" which could "encompass a set of circumstances
in which one or more activities could be described as fortuitous" as was
set out in the pleadings. However, His Honour found that although the
plaintiff's injury itself might be described as fortuitous or unexpected, the
incidents alleged in the pleading which caused the injury could only be
described as "undesirable" or "unfortunate" which was insufficient.92
The plaintiff's second argument was again based on a "chain of
circumstances" and suggested that it was sufficient that merely one element
in this chain be unusual or unexpected to convert the entire chain into an
89. Povc-i, V.C.A., supra note 9 at para 218. per Ashley JA.
90, Ibid at para. 17.
91 lbid at para. 18,
92. Mid at para, 14
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unexpected or unusual event. Ormiston J.A. swiftly rejected this as an
incorrect reading of O'Connor's words in Saks."
The plaintiff's third argument focused on the statement by O'Connor
J. in Saks that Article 17 will not allow a claim xhich results from "the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual. normal and expected
operation of the aircraft" [author's italics]. From that proposition, the
plaintiff sought to argue that if the injury resulted from "an unusual or
abnormal or unexpected operation of an aircraft's flight" then that would
be sufficient to constitute an accident [author's italics]. The implication
was that if the carrier was aware of the dangers of DVT, then it would
be usual to issue warnings about these risks. How eer, as noted above.
although this omission or inaction however negligent might lead to an
accident, it was not in itself an "accident.- Further, Ormiston J.A. pointed
out that having the issue of negligence introduced into the discussion of
Article 17 claims was misconceived.
The plaintiff's fourth argument relied on \ hat Ormiston J.A. referred to
as -textual indications" in other articles of the Il "iv-sai Convention to argue
that an omission could constitute an "accident." Specifically. reliance was
placed on Article 25 -\ here it provides that "'the limits of liability specified
in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from
an act of omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly."
However, as His Honour pointed out, although a reckless omission
may lead to an accident, this does not mean that the accident itself may be
constituted by an omission.'5 Presumably. if Article 25 is being relied upon
to remove the Convention's liability limits, this is because an accident
- and therefore a claim - has already been established under Article 17.
By that stage, the existence of an accident has already been proven and
is a matter of history. This is the limited relevance of "omissions" by the
carrier to bodily injuries claims, it only applies to the questions of the
extent of a proven Article 17 liability. Thus, Ormiston J.A. allowed the
carriers' appeals and struck out the plaintiff's claim, a decision with which
Chernov J.A. agreed.
This decision was subsequently affirmed by six of the seven judges
of the High Court of Australia.'" As stated in the joint judgment delivered
by four members of the court,' the plaintiff's argument before them was
based on three stages. Firstly, it was argued that no distinction should be
93. Ibid. at para. 15.
94. Ibid. at para. 16-20.
95. Ibid. at para. 21.
96. Pove,, H.C.A., supra note 10.
97. Ibid., per Gleeson C.J., Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ.
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drawn between "events" or "happenings" on one hand, and "non-events" or
"inaction" on the other. Secondly, that what was unexpected or unusual was
to be determined from the perspective of the passenger as distinct from the
carrier. And thirdly, that an "accident" as a temporal concept might occur
during the whole of a flight." Ho\e\ er, beyond this formulation there was
little in the plaintiff's case to differ from the way it was put before the
lower courts. In the decision, the Saks formulation of"accident" was once
again affirmed, and the claim was refused, their Honours observing that "it
is central to the appellant's case that nothing happened on board the aircraft
which is in any respect out of the ordinary or unusual"." Indeed, in taking
the discussion a step further, the reasoning in the joint judgment raised one
further temporal difficulty concerning the plaintiff's argument that a failure
to w am could be an accident. \Vhere was there a prescription as to when
such a warning should be gi\en? Article 17 requires the accident to occur
if not on board the aircraft, then at least during the operations of embarking
or disembarking. Howe\ er, if the failure to wam - by itself and separately
from the other ordinary and usual "flight conditions" - was considered to
be an "event" or "happening" and therefore possibly an "accident", why
should the required warning not have been given at a much earlier stage,
such as when making arrangements to travel by air, rather than on board
the aircraft'? Certainly, the Convention gives no instruction on this point.
In this context, therefore, their Honours said that the focusing on a failure
to warn was a "distraction" and "unhelpful," because it diverted attention
from \\hat actually happened on the aircraft, to "what might have, could
ha\ e or perhaps should have happened there and v, hy that should be so."'1°
The latter of these two \\as not the relevant question to be asked.
On this latter point the majoritN clearl% identified a serious flaw with
the plaintiff's case. Indeed, had they found for the plaintiff, the difficulties
which could arise in future cases are an easy subject for speculation. For
example, had the failure to warn been accepted as an accident under Article
17, then the further possibility arises \% hereby a carrier could actually give
such a warning when a ticket is first issued, but be subsequently liable
for a DVT injury incurred because the carrier failed to give a further
warning during the flight or during embarkation or disembarkation.
Thus is clearly evident at least one of the certainties inherent in the Saks
definition of"accident," that an "e\ent" or "happening" is not the same as
an "omission."
'JX Ibid at para. 29.
Ibtd at para 40.
100 Ibid at paras 41-42
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In summary, the difficulty in the DIVT Group Litigation and Povcv
was apparent from the start in the pleading quoted above. Probably those
pleadings did correctly set out the causes of DVT, but they did not disclose
an "accident." Recalling the basic Saks definition as being an unexpected
or unusual event or happening, any person who has had experience of
long-haul air travel would find the basic difficulty in the pleadings was that
they read like a very neat summary of the usual incidents of such flights:
there was nothing unexpected and there "\as nothing unusual.'"I Indeed,
this is the irony of the situation. Because the circumstances which lead to
the injury are expected, as is the injury itself, this is precisely the reason
why such an injury is not covered b\ Article 17.112
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that there are certain claims for personal
injuries experienced during international air tra\el \\hich neither the
Hliarsaw Convention nor the .Iontr Convenlion cover. However, that
some claims which are so well associated w ith air travel such as DVT are
not covered is perplexing - but nevertheless explicable. As Ormiston J.A.
remarked in the final words of his judgment in Povev:
If the result seems harsh, and \re ha\e no means of testing how the
allegations would stand up at common law, then that is the result of
this nation's choosing to enter into specific treaty arrangements as are
embodied in the Convention. inevitabl, designed to benefit some and
deny rights to other.'""
If Article 17 does not recognize a claim which occurs during
international carriage to which the Warsaw Convention applies, then the
claimant is left without a claim. This is the clear opinion of courts around
the world. The Conventions "cover the field" relating to a passenger's
101. In fact, this is exactly what Chenov J.A said in his brief judgment in Pove.v, saying that the
causes of the plaintiff's DVT. did not constitute an "event ot happening", and it they did, then his
injuries were "his own reaction to standard flight conditions". see Porey' VC.A .supra note 9 at para.
4,.
102. Indeed, as Ru\%antissa Abe.ratne has recently noted:
It is an incontrovertible fact that air travel at high altitudes and long durations may involve
stagnant recycled air, fluctuations in cabin pressure and jet lag. The pas,,cnger may end up
at his destination dehydrated and disoriented. Additionall., smaller seat pitch, particularly in
economy class, may seriously affect the circulatory process, causing thromboembolism. It is
reported that the Aerospace Medical Association Journal in I 9X8 concluded that the risk of
fatal pulmonary embolism %%as at least 10 times greater after travel than before, linking the
risk to long periods of sitting and cramped seating.
This short passage illustrates once again, the reason why the claim for a D.V.T. injury incurred during
international air carriage is elusix e under Article 17. See Ruwantissa Abeyratne. "The Economy Class
Syndrome and Air Carrier Liability", (2001) 28 Transp. L. J. 251, 252-253.
103. Pove, V.C.A., supra note 9 at para. 41
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claims against a carrier for loss incurred during international carriage.
Indeed, despite some earlier suggestions that perhaps a claim might exist
where the Warsaw Convention fails to provide one, in the last decade
both the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the United States have
confirmed that the Convention provides the exclusive cause of action. As
Lord Hope of Craighead said in Sidhu v British Airways, when dismissing
a claim in negligence for mental injuries brought by a plaintiff outside of
the terms of the Convention:
The Convention does not purport to deal with all matters relating to
contracts of international carriage by air. But in those areas with which
it deals - and the liability of the carrier is one of them - the code is
intended to be uniform and to be exclusiv e also of any resort to the rules
of domestic lav....
...It was not designed to provide remedies against the carrier to enable
all losses to be compensated. It was designed instead to define those
situations in which compensation was to be available. 'I
More recently, this view was endorsed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in El 41 Israel Airlines v. Tseng,10 when it also disallowed a
claim for mental injuries which was being brought outside of Article 17.
In addition, the Supreme Court was able to cite during the course of its
judgment authorities from a number of other common law jurisdictions,
including Canada, " ' New Zealand,07 and Singapore. 0
HoN ever, it is also incongruous that a compromise agreed upon
over seventy years ago, should still determine what are the rights and
liabilities of carriers and their passengers in the twenty-first century. This
appearance of incongruity is highlighted when it is recalled that many of
the claims excluded today were barely understood or even recognized in
the early days of flight. If only for this reason, Article 17 of the Warsaw
and Akmtreal Conventions should be reconsidered.
Indeed, if that symbol of an ancient legal system which exists in the
English-speaking world today, the common law, can manage to move
forward as it has over the last seventy years, then surely so too should
a legal regime of more recent descent which stands as a hallmark of
104 Sidhu, supra note 33 at 453.
105. 525 U.S. 155 (S. Ct., 1999).
106. Gal v \,rtlhern Mountain Helicopters, Do%:. No. 34918349 18, 1998 B.C.T.C. Lexis 1351
(B.C S.C.). This decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia was confirmed on appeal, see Gal
v Northern Ih,unain flheoptcr, [11991] II .W.R. (B.C.C.A.); see also Navel Torres v Northwest
Airlines( 19981, 159 D.L.R. 4") 67 (Ont.. Gen. Div.).
107. Emera A r Freight Corp r .erine Nursecrie.. [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 723 (H.C.).
I K Scag te Technolog, hiternational v Changi Intenational Airport Services, [1997] 3 Sing. L.R I
(C.A.).
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globalization.' °9 In fact, in matters regulating so obvious a symbol of
the modem age as air travel, a similar le\ el of modernity should also be
sought. The aircraft which fly the skies of today are a far cry from their
predecessors of the 1 9 20s. Arguably, the same should be said of the laws
which govern the incidents \\ hich occur on those aircraft. It is high time
that the states who are parties to the Warsaw system and the Montreal
Convention reconsider whether the balance of the rights between carriers
and their passengers should be revisited.'"0
109. Coincidentally, it is over such a time frame - which is contemporaneous with the existence of the
Warsaw System - that the law of negligence has de% eloped from that basic case dealing with the lady
vwho became ill after taking a drink from a bottle -hich also contained a snail, see Donoghue, supra
note 55.
110. It is perhaps worth noting that even prior to the D.T. decisions discussed in this article, some
states were slow to embrace the Montreal Convention for other reasons. For example, the Department
of Transport and Regional Services in Australia released a discussion paper in January 2001 to canvass
whether the convention should be adopted, see DOTARS, supra note 22. Howeer, in the wake of
the terrorist hijackings of 11 September of that year, the Department put such matters to one side.
As the Department's Annual Report 2001-02 stated: "The events of I I September 2001 forced a re-
allocation of resources...,which meant that there was limited progress on dealing with the responses
to the January 2001 departmental discussion paper...". Austl., Department of Transport and Regional
Services, Annual Report 2001-02 (Canberra: Department of Transport and Regional Services, 2002),
online: <http://www.dotarsgov.audepl/annrpt/0102/3-2-2-18.htm> (date accessed: 27 March 2004).
How convincing a reason for delay this is will vary from commentator to commentator. However, in
2004 the matter was still under consideration.

